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ARTICLE
Perceptions of bioenergy with carbon capture and
storage in different policy scenarios
Rob Bellamy1, Javier Lezaun2 & James Palmer3
There is growing interest in bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) as a possible
technology for removing CO2 from the atmosphere. In the ﬁrst study of its kind, we inves-
tigate whether and how different forms of incentivisation impact on public perceptions of this
technology. We develop a new experimental method to triangulate perceptions of BECCS in
different policy scenarios through quantitative measurement and qualitative elicitation. Here
we show that the type of policy instrument used to incentivise BECCS signiﬁcantly affects
perceptions of the technology itself. While we ﬁnd approval of coercive and persuasion-based
policy scenarios for incentivisation, supportive instruments proved polarising. Payments
based on the amount of CO2 removed from the atmosphere were approved, but guarantees
of higher prices for producers selling energy derived from BECCS were strongly opposed. We
conclude that public support for BECCS is inextricably linked to attitudes towards the policies
through which it is incentivised.
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The Paris Agreement on climate change has set out a legallybinding commitment to keep the increase in global averagetemperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels,
with an ambition to limit the rise to 1.5 °C. The Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that meeting
these targets is still possible, but nearly all modelling scenarios
assume this will require extensive deployment of negative emis-
sions technologies (NETs) by the end of the century, and most of
those scenarios have relied on bioenergy with carbon capture
(BECCS) to deliver the necessary levels of carbon dioxide
removal1,2. BECCS involves the generation of energy through
the burning of biomass (wood and agricultural products, solid
waste, landﬁll gas and biogas or ethanol and biodiesel) coupled
with the capture (via post-combustion, oxyfuel or pre-combus-
tion) and storage of the resulting CO2 (CCS) in geological or
other long-term reservoirs. If biomass cultivation and associated
land-use changes are practised sustainably, this process has the
potential to remove CO2 from the atmosphere, thereby delivering
net-negative emissions.
Despite growing interest in NETs, and in BECCS in particular,
it remains unclear how this technology might reshape existing
climate policy and energy systems. Indeed, it is currently given a
low priority by state and non-state climate policy actors3, and
progress is increasingly recognised as an uphill struggle rather
than the slippery slope that some had anticipated4. One parti-
cularly understudied question concerns public views on the
acceptability of BECCS, and the role that policy instruments
might play in shaping those views. This is an urgent question to
address, particularly given that BECCS presents signiﬁcant chal-
lenges to dominant energy generation and climate policy
regimes5, and will not come forward without strong institutional
support and signiﬁcant new incentives for research, development,
demonstration and deployment (RDD&D)6. In other words, if
BECCS is to emerge as a viable option for tackling climate change,
it will inevitably do so as an explicitly political technology driven
by distinct policy initiatives. Accounting for public preferences
and concerns will thus be key to ensuring an effective, acceptable
and democratic decision-making process towards the uptake of
BECCS, should it be deemed appropriate for support and
incentivisation.
This study explored public perceptions of BECCS using an
experimental, mixed methods approach that situated the tech-
nology within three different policy scenarios (see Methods for
full details). Our focus on BECCS had a two-fold purpose. First,
despite its high and growing degree of policy relevance, public
perceptions of BECCS remain under-researched relative to
alternative technologies of greenhouse gas removal and other
forms of geoengineering7–12. Second, focussing on a single tech-
nology allowed a proper investigation of how alternative policy
scenarios might affect perceptions of that technology, a question
that has largely been ignored in studies of public opinion in this
area, and in research on public perceptions of novel technologies
more widely. Rather than assuming that public views are formed
in relation to the technical characteristics of the technology, we
assert that they emerge with regard to tightly coupled socio-
technical systems within which those technical features are
embedded11,13–15. Despite these novel aspects, and in line with
increasing moves to broaden research on public participation in
the development of new technologies16, it is important that our
study be seen within the extant wider ecology of studies on the
public legitimacy of alternative options for decarbonisation.
To create a study population, a stratiﬁed sampling technique
was used to recruit a socio-demographically representative and
politically diverse cross-section of the public from Oxfordshire,
UK. Participants attended a one-day experiment and were divi-
ded into three groups, with each being asked to (1) express and
discuss their views on BECCS, and (2) deliberate on a different
set of policy instruments that could hypothetically be used to
incentivise BECCS. To characterise these three alternative
BECCS policy scenarios, we used a modiﬁed version of
Bemelmans-Videc et al.’s17 tripartite typology of economic,
regulatory and informational policy instruments: carrots, sticks
and sermons.
In a coercive policy scenario (group 1), the mechanism of
inﬂuence on economic operators (speciﬁcally fossil fuel energy
generating companies) was the threat of removing resources in
the event that they failed to effect a transition to BECCS. In a
supportive policy scenario (group 2), economic operators were to
be inﬂuenced by the promise of new resources if they chose to
transition to BECCS. Finally, in a persuasive policy scenario
(group 3), the actions of economic operators were to be inﬂu-
enced by transferring information and communicating the need
for BECCS through reasoned argument. Each of the scenarios was
represented in the experiment itself by two concrete policy
instruments: taxes and standards in the coercive policy scenario;
ﬁxed payments and price guarantees in the supportive policy
scenario; lobbying and certiﬁcation in the persuasion-based
policy scenario. While these do not capture the full diversity of
policy instruments available to policy-makers in the real world,
the scenarios provide a useful heuristic with which to delimit
three distinctive and contrasting approaches to the incentivisation
of technological transitions.
Here we use this novel experimental approach to analyse
perceptions of BECCS in different policy scenarios. First, our
study shows a high level of support for BECCS RDD&D, but this
is qualiﬁed by a range of concerns. Second, we show a high level
of support for coercive and persuasion-based policy instruments
for incentivising BECCS, particularly in the form of standards
and lobbying. Third, we show a statistically signiﬁcant reduced
level of support for BECCS following discussion of the supportive
policy scenario. We conclude that the acceptability of BECCS will
be determined not merely by its innate technical characteristics,
but by the nature of the coupled socio-technical systems within
which it is embedded. Furthermore, the salience in our study of a
UK-speciﬁc policy analogy (price guarantees to energy providers
to incentivise nuclear power generation) suggests that public
support for BECCS—and possibly for other NETs—will be highly
sensitive to features of the national policy context, and speciﬁcally
to the political acceptability of alternative ways of incentivising
the private sector.
Results
Perceptions of BECCS at the start of the experiment. Nearly all
participants expressed concern about climate change, with 63.6%
very concerned and 33.3% somewhat concerned. Similarly, most
participants saw the need to tackle climate change as urgent, with
69.7% seeing it as very urgent and 27.3 seeing it as somewhat
urgent. However, few participants indicated that they were aware
of BECCS prior to the experiment, with 78.8% reporting that they
knew nothing or only a little about the subject, and 21.2%
reporting that they knew a fair amount.
Fig. 1 shows participant support for different dimensions of
BECCS at the start of the experiment. There was more overall
support for BECCS than there was opposition, with 72.8% of
participants indicating that they were somewhat or strongly in
support, and 27.3% somewhat opposed. No participant showed
strong opposition. Support for research into BECCS was
higher still, with 94.0% somewhat or strongly in support
and 6.0% somewhat opposed. Support was slightly lower for
deployment, with 75.0% somewhat or strongly in support and
25.0% somewhat or strongly in opposition.
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Several concerns qualiﬁed support for BECCS. Worries about
the geographical footprint of the production networks and other
infrastructures that would be required for BECCS consistently
emerged in all group discussions. A particular preoccupation was
that “we don’t have enough land [in the UK]” to grow sufﬁcient
quantities of biomass (group 1, participant I), and that
consideration should therefore be given to cultivating biomass
in other countries that might be better suited for the task: “You
may as well do it in an area that’s ideal for it, rather than trying to
do it, cram it into everywhere” (1A). Relatedly, scaling up was a
main point of discussion in groups 1 and 2, with participants
highlighting that “if it were to be effective the technology has to
be generalisable around the planet quite quickly,” and questioning
whether it could be “generalised quickly enough for the price
[cost] to come down” (2F).
The geopolitical feasibility of pursuing BECCS emerged as an
issue in group 1, where some participants mentioned that it might
be more feasible in authoritarian countries such as China
“because they can just say, all right, you as an individual, too
bad, you have to do it, that’s it” (1K). Further to this point, the
pursuit of BECCS in developing countries was seen by some as an
economic opportunity in that “it’s going to be good for the
country because they are going to be exporting the goods
[biomass] and getting money back in, and that has to actually
help the country as a whole” (1E). On the other hand, ethical
concerns were raised in that “it’s as if we’re saying that their land
is less important than our land” (1K).
BECCS was not seen as a “one-size ﬁts all solution” across all
three groups, with participants instead recognising the need for
alternative options (“it makes more sense to say, well in this
country this source of renewable energy makes the most sense”
(0I)). The question of “why aren’t we focussing more on the
renewable sources that are already there” (1A) was a particular
concern in group 1’s discussions, raising the possibility that
BECCS might be seen as a distraction from those alternatives
(a version of the moral hazard or mitigation deterrence
argument). Support for research was consistently strong, with
some participants in group 1 arguing that this should be driven
by business as “it has to be proﬁtable otherwise you aren’t going
to do it (1K)”. Similarly, some in group 3 questioned “why should
the tax payer pay for it? Because you know, the economy is
already pretty shaky without putting through these little ideas.
How much is it going to cost?” (3B).
Support for the biomass energy component of BECCS was
relatively high, with 71.0% of participants somewhat or strongly
in favour and 29.0% somewhat against. No participant indicated
strong opposition to biomass energy generation. Support for
using land to grow biomass for energy was lower, however, with
63.6% somewhat or strongly in support and 36.4% somewhat or
strongly in opposition. Support for using prime agricultural land
was lower still, with 33.3% somewhat or strongly in favour
and 66.7% somewhat or strongly against. Support for using
biomass which has been grown abroad to generate energy in the
UK was mixed: 48.5% of participants claimed to be somewhat or
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Support for BECCS deployment (s.d. = 0.73)
Support for BECCS research (s.d. = 0.62)
Support for BECCS overall (s.d. = 0.65)
Support for CCS underground storage (s.d. = 0.80)
Support for CCS overall (s.d. = 0.67)
Support for growing biomass abroad (s.d. = 0.91)
Support for using prime land to grow biomass (s.d. = 0.88)
Support for using land to grow biomass (s.d. = 0.82)
Support for biomass energy overall (s.d. = 0.67)
Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support
Fig. 1 Support for different dimensions of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage at the start of the experiment (% of participants, n= 33). Attitudes
were elicited on a four-point scale (1= strongly oppose, 2= somewhat oppose, 3= somewhat support, 4= strongly support). The questions to which each
dimension of BECCS pertains can be found in Supplementary Note 1
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strongly in support, while 51.5% were somewhat or strongly
opposed.
The potential for land-use conﬂicts emerged as a concern in all
groups with respect to energy generation from biomass,
particularly in relation to food production on prime agricultural
land. In groups 1 and 2 participants nevertheless suggested
several proposals for minimising these conﬂicts, including
arguments stating that there was “no reason why you can’t have
agroforestry” (1H) and combine food production and biomass
production. Others asked “why can’t we use food waste?” (1A) as
a fuel source, or pointed to new technological options to solve
some of the bottlenecks (“because we’ve got irrigation, like drip
irrigation, we’ve also got like hydroponics, so there are ways to
produce a lot more plants” (2A)).
Some participants in groups 1 and 3 felt that transport fuels
required to move biomass would likely be fossil-based, and that
this “adds emissions to the equation then. If you’re shipping it via
diesel steamer then…” (1G). Wider concerns about the environ-
mental impacts that biomass production might have, including
the perception in groups 1 and 2 that “at the moment, as far as
I’m aware, deforestation outweighs the beneﬁts that can be gained
from an increase in biomass” (2L). Other participants suggested
that these impacts could be minimised by using “certain [plant]
species perhaps that are faster growing that might be able to
sustain the need for this biomass” (1G).
There was more overall support for the CCS component of
BECCS than there was opposition, with 84.8% somewhat or
strongly in support and 15.2% somewhat in opposition. No
participant indicated strong opposition. A more focused question
on storing carbon in underground geological formations yielded a
different picture, however, with 53.1% indicating that they were
somewhat or strongly in support, while 46.9% were somewhat or
strongly opposed.
In all three groups, discussions about the CCS component of
BECCS touched on the safety of storage. A particularly salient
worry was leakage of CO2 from the storage facility: “shoving CO2
underground is ﬁne, but will it leak?” (3I). This worry was
lessened where CO2 in liquid form was concerned: “The trick is
getting the CO2 into a liqueﬁed form, which you can then pump
from your place of production to the place of storage” (3I).
Participants in all three groups compared the storage aspect of
CCS with the long-term undertaking and costs associated with
radioactive waste disposal: “it’s similar in terms of nuclear energy
in that it would be burying the waste in the Earth, and what
happens after a certain time?” (1I).
Policy instrument preferences for incentivising BECCS. Fig-
ure 2 shows participant support for different policy scenarios and
instruments for incentivising BECCS. The possibility of man-
dating BECCS through coercive policy instruments received more
support than opposition, with 81.8% of the subsection of parti-
cipants who discussed this option somewhat or strongly in sup-
port and 18.2% somewhat in opposition. No participant indicated
that they were strongly in opposition. Support for taxes was
lower, however, with 36.4% somewhat in support and 63.6%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Group (3) Support for certification for BECCS (s.d. = 0.70)
Group (3) Support for lobbying for BECCS (s.d. = 0.50)
Group (3) Support for persuasion of BECCS scenario overall (s.d. = 0.65)
Group (2) Support for a price guarantee for BECCS (s.d. = 0.87)
Group (2) Support for fixed payments for BECCS (s.d. = 0.67)
Group (2) Support for funding BECCS scenario overall (s.d. = 0.67)
Group (1) Support for standards for BECCS (s.d. = 0.57)
Group (1) Support for taxes for BECCS (s.d. = 0.88)
Group (1) Support for mandating BECCS scenario overall (s.d. = 0.84)
Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support
Fig. 2 Support for different policy scenarios and instruments for incentivising bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (% of participants, group 1 n= 11,
group 2 n= 12, group 3 n= 10). Attitudes were elicited on a four-point scale (1= strongly oppose, 2= somewhat oppose, 3= somewhat support, 4=
strongly support). The questions to which each dimension of BECCS pertains can be found in Supplementary Note 2
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somewhat in opposition. Support for mandatory standards was
higher, with 63.6% somewhat or strongly in support and 36.4%
somewhat in opposition.
Discussions of the coercive BECCS policy scenario (group 1)
focussed on three main issues. The ﬁrst of these concerned the
perceived need for international coordination or some other
“super-governmental regulation” (1C) to ensure that national
governments did not renege on their commitments to BECCS.
The second issue concerned potential resistance from fossil fuel
energy companies or even a “full-scale legal blockage” (1A) of
such a mandate. The third issue concerned the need for any such
mandate to be introduced gradually over a transition period.
Reference was made here to the advisability of “going more slowly
and encouraging small changes… building it up so the people get
used to a change ﬁrst, and then put on more, rather than putting
on 100% of the change all in one go” (1A). Others highlighted the
value of building “one or two test sites to feed into the National
Grid… and work out all the kinks and issues… and then you
could start to expand it to the existing power plants and start
determining, can this plant actually be converted? Can this not?
Alright, let’s convert the ones that can, and then build others that
can” (1K).
New taxes on fossil fuel energy companies in particular were
seen as a potential stimulus for secondary industries, providing
“the funding and ﬁnancing for the research for the alternative
fuels, without having it going through the energy companies,
essentially. And then, through that research, you could create
another energy company” (1K). The UK’s plastic bag charge was
seen as an analogous, and successful, taxation instrument, being
“by far the most effective way at reducing plastic… I don’t think
they went far enough with that actually” (1A). On the other hand,
these taxes were seen as posing “the risk of falling on the
consumer. The company can just put up the price” (1D), resulting
in a transfer of cost to consumers. Participants argued that
standards should be targeted at the “worst offenders” (1A) and be
introduced only after the technology had been developed.
There were much lower levels of support for incentivising
BECCS with supportive policy instruments (group 2), with 33.3%
of participants somewhat or strongly in favour and 66.7%
somewhat or strongly against. Support for ﬁxed payments was
high, with 75.0% somewhat or strongly in support and 25.0%
somewhat in opposition. Support for a price guarantee was,
however, much lower, with only 8.3% somewhat in support and
91.7% somewhat or strongly in opposition.
Discussions of the supportive BECCS policy scenario in group
2 focussed on the potential cost to consumers of new incentives.
This was due to the generalised assumption that “energy
generated under these conditions will be more expensive than
some other types of energy… This would put the energy bills up
for sure and therefore a lot of ordinary people… would be against
it on cost grounds” (2F).
Fixed payments in particular were praised because they
reward companies for “actually taking [CO2] out of the air” by
the amount removed “rather than just… paying people to have
the BECCS technology” (2A), which would not directly
incentivise removal and could result in less being removed.
This argument was made with the caveat that CO2 should be
“not only removed, but also properly stored” (2C). A price
guarantee, on the other hand, was broadly opposed. This was
explicitly related to the use of this policy instrument to subsidise
nuclear power generation. Price guarantees were seen as “a big,
big problem in relation to new nuclear power stations when
they’re guaranteeing very high electricity prices, which they
expect us to pay; thank you very much” (2F). The speciﬁc
example of the nuclear power station currently under construc-
tion at Hinkley Point C was raised by participants to argue that
price guarantee schemes transfer excessive costs to taxpayers and
energy consumers.
There was overall support for the use by governments of
persuasive strategies to incentivise BECCS, with 80.0% somewhat
or strongly in support of this approach and 20.0% somewhat in
opposition. Speciﬁc policy instruments fared worse; however,
60.0% of participants were somewhat or strongly in support of
lobbying, with 40.0% somewhat in opposition. Support for
government-sponsored certiﬁcation schemes was lower still, with
40.0% somewhat or strongly in support and 60.0% somewhat or
strongly in opposition.
Discussions in group 3 focussed primarily on the limited value
of persuasion and the need for other forms of incentivisation.
There was widespread scepticism about the effectiveness of
policies solely based on persuasion and information provision:
“personally I think you promote change by regulation, not by
persuasion” (3A), “if you’ve got a couple of interested
billionaires… maybe you could get a bit of funding to get it off
the ground” (3A) and “I would regulate through carbon taxes
myself” (3E). Persuasion was seen as potentially a ﬁrst step before
such coercive or supportive measures were applied. Individual
persuasion-based instruments were seen as unlikely to succeed in
the face of powerful vested interests in the fossil fuel industry. The
example of gun ownership laws in America was raised as a
relevant analogy: “even with incredibly reasonable evidence,
[regarding] America’s gun laws, people [are] getting shot up left,
right and centre; still people aren’t really changing their minds
about that because of vested interest” (3A).
Certiﬁcation in particular was seen as needing a negative
accreditation component (i.e. “naming and blaming” energy
generating companies that failed to incorporate BECCS): “you
know we’ve got this Fair Trade certifying… we shouldn’t do it
that way round. If you’re Fair Traded you don’t get a label but if
you’re not then you get a sticker which, pardon my French, says
Bastard Trade” (3D). Certiﬁcation was also only seen as likely to
work if public education on climate change and wider environ-
mental issues were to be signiﬁcantly increased. Education was
seen as being “absolutely central. All right, it’s slow responding,
and some people will totally blank it out. And ultimately you do
possibly have to have some form of regulation or some sanction
at the end of it to justify it” (3D).
Perceptions of BECCS at the end of the experiment. Following a
Shapiro–Wilk test for normality of distribution, a series of non-
parametric statistical tests were performed to test (1) the differ-
ences between the three groups and (2) the differences between
paired samples before and after participation in the discussion of
policy scenarios. Figure 3 shows differences in support for BECCS
between groups before and after exposure to and deliberation on
policy scenarios.
After a non-parametric Levene’s test that veriﬁed homosce-
dasticity in the samples (p > 0.05), a Kruskal–Wallis H test
revealed that before exposure to, and deliberation on, the
different policy scenarios, there was no statistically signiﬁcant
difference in the level of support for BECCS across the three
groups (p > 0.05). A non-parametric Levene’s test then showed
that heteroscedasticity arose in the samples after participation in
the scenario conditions (p < 0.05). A Mood’s median test (which
unlike the Kruskal–Wallis H test does not assume homogeneity of
variance) revealed a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the level
of support for BECCS (χ2 (2)= 6.199, p < 0.05) between the three
groups. Pearson's χ2 and Cramer’s V post-hoc tests revealed that
the difference lay between the groups that had engaged with the
coercive and supportive policy scenarios for the incentivisation of
BECCS (χ2 (1)= 5.282, p < 0.05, ϕc= 0.479). The group that had
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-08592-5 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2019) 10:743 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-08592-5 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 5
discussed supportive policy instruments showed a signiﬁcantly
lower level of support for BECCS at the conclusion of the
experiment.
A Wilcoxon's signed-rank test revealed that levels of support
for BECCS (Z=−2.333, p < 0.05), its CCS component (Z=
−3.207, p < 0.01) and the underground storage component of
CCS (Z=−2.333, p < 0.05) were all statistically signiﬁcantly
lower after deliberation of supportive policy instruments. In the
groups that had deliberated on coercive and persuasion-based
policy instruments, there were no statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ences on any questions between their views before and after the
discussion.
Consistent with the literature on attitudes towards government
intervention in climate change18, a Spearman’s ρ test revealed a
very statistically signiﬁcant correlation between attitudes towards
the role of government and concern about climate change both
before (rs=−0.457, p < 0.01) and after (rs=−0.494, p < 0.01)
exposure to, and deliberation on, the speciﬁc policy scenarios,
with those opposing government regulation being relatively less
concerned about climate change. There was, however, no
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between attitudes towards
the role of government and level of support for BECCS.
In sum, those participants who were asked to consider the
supportive policy scenario (which included ﬁxed payments and
price guarantees) displayed at the conclusion of the experiment a
signiﬁcant reduction in their support for BECCS, while
participants in the other groups remained largely constant in
their views. Considering that attitudes towards government
intervention had no statistical inﬂuence on support for BECCS,
and that the two policy instruments discussed in the supportive
group elicited very different levels of support, it is reasonable to
deduce that the reduction in support for BECCS was primarily a
result of the extended discussions about price guarantees.
Speciﬁcally, the reduction in the level of support for BECCS
would seem to be the result of the concern that there would be a
direct cost to tax payers and energy users if BECCS were to be
incentivised by this method.
Discussion
In this study, we sought to elicit public views on the acceptability
of BECCS, and to explore how exposure to speciﬁc policy pro-
posals affected initial levels of support for this technology, as one
possible approach to carbon dioxide removal.
First, we showed a high level of support for BECCS RDD&D
among our participants, despite a generally low level of awareness
of BECCS prior to the experiment. This initial position was
qualiﬁed by a range of concerns, including: geographical
footprint, scaling challenges, marginalisation of alternative
approaches to climate change, public costs, geopolitical feasibility,
land-use conﬂicts, transport sustainability, environmental
impacts, and the safety and duration of carbon storage. Partici-
pants also proposed actions for minimising some of these con-
cerns, including: agroforestry, use of food and animal waste as
feedstocks, improved irrigation, hydroponics, and faster-growing
or higher-yielding crops.
Second, we showed a high level of support among our parti-
cipants for coercive and persuasion-based policy instruments for
incentivising BECCS, particularly in the form of standards and
lobbying, but less so from taxes or certiﬁcation schemes. To be
effective, coercive incentives were seen to require global coordi-
nation, a gradual transition period, and a commitment to over-
ride the expected resistance of fossil fuel energy companies.
Persuasion was deemed to be ineffective in the face of vested
interests in the absence of additional forms of incentivisation.
Third, we showed a statistically signiﬁcantly lower level of
support for BECCS followed discussion of the supportive policy
scenario. In particular, there was a great deal of opposition
towards a price guarantee scheme, stemming largely from parti-
cipants’ knowledge of the high costs being imposed on taxpayers
by this mechanism in order to support new nuclear energy pro-
vision (i.e. Hinkley Point C). On the other hand, there was a high
level of support for ﬁxed payments, which were the highest
ranked policy instrument in the study, apparently owing to their
ability to establish a direct link between public spending and the
climate change performance of BECCS operators.
While our experiment represents one of the ﬁrst studies into
public perceptions of BECCS as a combined approach to tackling
climate change, our results are largely consistent with the existing
literature on public perceptions of its two components, bioenergy
generation and CCS19–23. The fact that putting these two com-
ponents together does not result in a signiﬁcant shift in attitudes
towards the technologies is a notable ﬁnding, which extends this
literature. Moreover, the combination of bioenergy with CCS
does raises a number of novel emergent issues, concerning pri-
marily the intended scale of BECCS deployment. In this way,
views on BECCS appear to be inﬂuenced by similar considera-
tions to those which apply to other carbon dioxide removal
technologies, or even solar geoengineering interventions. For
instance, geographical footprint, scaling challenges, margin-
alisation of mitigation alternatives, and geopolitical feasibility
have all featured prominently in studies of public perceptions of
these wider technologies7,9–11.
Our experiment also shows that the choice of policy instru-
ment with which to incentivise BECCS may have a signiﬁcant
impact on the level of public support for this approach. Those
Coercive
group
Supportive
group
Persuasive
group
Supportive
group
Persuasive
group
Coercive
group
n.s. n.s.
n.s.
n.s.5.282*
n.s.
–2.333*
n.s.
n.s.
Before policy scenario
exposure and deliberation
After policy scenario
exposure and deliberation
Fig. 3 Differences in support for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage between groups before and after exposure to, and deliberation on, policy
scenarios (*p < 0.05, n.s.= not signiﬁcant, n= 33). Two-headed arrows indicate statistical tests of difference between the designated different groups,
where values provided are the Pearson's χ2 statistic. Single-headed arrows indicate statistical tests of difference on the designated same group before and
after discussion of the policy scenarios, where values provided are the Wilcoxon's signed-rank test Z statistic
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participants in our study who engaged in detail with supportive
policy instruments expressed at the end the experiment a sig-
niﬁcantly lower level of support for BECCS than when they
started. This is a reminder that support for BECCS—and indeed
for any other proposed NET—is likely to be mediated by public
views on the choice of policy used to incentivise it, and not merely
by perceptions of climate change or of the particular technical
aspects of the approach in question. In other words, the level of
public support for a speciﬁc technical solution will depend on
how it is embedded within broader socio-technical systems and
policy frameworks. Further research on public perceptions and
the social acceptability of carbon dioxide removal must therefore
consider each technological alternative within speciﬁc policy and
socio-political contexts.
Given that in our study a signiﬁcant shift in support for BECCS
seems to arise from the salience of a UK-speciﬁc analogy con-
cerning the incentivisation of nuclear power generation, it will
also be crucial for future research to be sensitive to different
geographical contexts. Indeed, geographically situated thinking
will be vital to understanding how perceptions of emerging socio-
technical systems involving BECCS, or other carbon dioxide
removal options, are mediated by local contexts and spaces24.
Correspondingly, any climate policy informed by this research
will do well to be consistent with the bottom-up architecture of
the Paris Agreement, with incentives being set at the level of state
or regional jurisdictions and informed by their preferences of
their respective publics, so as to reﬂect different national political
cultures and priorities.
Methods
Sample design. We conducted a one-day exploratory experiment in Oxford on
24th March 2018. A stratiﬁed sampling technique was used to recruit 33 socio-
demographically representative and politically diverse participants from the county
of Oxfordshire, UK (see Table 1). The exploratory nature of this research meant
that while this was a statistically large sample25, this quantitative representation of
the target population of Oxfordshire does not extend to broader populations,
including the UK at large or indeed to other national contexts. Nevertheless, by
sampling for a diversity of political perspectives—both between and within political
ideologies (captured by the political party respondents were most likely to support
and their attitude towards government regulation of individual behaviours)—we
built in an additional, broader level of qualitative representation along those
dimensions26. The consistency of public perceptions across different countries in
relation to other climate engineering technologies12,27,28 suggests the possibility of
generalising aspects of our results more widely.
Experiment protocol. The one-day experiment comprised several sessions
designed to triangulate—through quantitative measurement and qualitative elici-
tation—public perceptions of BECCS and the effect of different policy scenarios on
the level of support for it (see Table 2). The study began with a plenary intro-
duction to climate change (including basic science of observed climate changes,
impacts and the policy context of the Paris Agreement) and to BECCS (including a
basic overview of its constituent technical components, bioenergy and CCS, and the
manner of their combination). Questions were invited and during the subsequent
discussions a state-of-the-art technical summary of BECCS’ potentials, costs and
risks29 was on hand to respond to requests for more information (see Table 3).
The introduction was immediately followed by a quantitative survey to measure
individuals’ baseline perceptions of BECCS (see Supplementary Note 1). The next
phase was a 1 h and 15 min facilitated, audio-recorded group discussion designed
to elicit qualitative reasonings underpinning those survey responses. Crucially, this
phase allowed for participants to introduce and deliberate on their own broader
framings of the issue under consideration (which in practice included drawing
attention to alternative courses of action for decarbonisation). Facilitators
moreover took care not to introduce any framings of their own. The participants
were then divided into three homogeneous groups, each designed to be internally
heterogeneous socio-demographically and politically. Each subgroup was
introduced to a different policy scenario for incentivising BECCS (see section on
Policy scenarios). A 2 h facilitated, audio-recorded group discussion then focussed
on the respective scenario, paying particular attention to the perceived strengths
and weaknesses of the approach and its wider implications for tackling climate
change. The experiment concluded with a second quantitative survey designed to
measure changes in individuals’ perceptions of BECCS after exposure to the policy
scenarios and the subsequent deliberations (see Supplementary Note 2).
Each of the three group discussions was facilitated by one of the authors.
Facilitators sought equal contributions by participants, restricting dominant
personalities and encouraging talk by quieter participants. Participants were
allowed to raise alternative policy scenarios as a means of critiquing the scenario
under consideration in their group. If required, facilitators prompted discussion
Table 1 Participants
Sociodemographic
variables
Coercive
group
Supportive
group
Persuasive
group
Total
Gender
Male 4 5 6 15
Female 7 7 4 18
Age
18–24 3 2 1 6
25–44 5 3 3 11
45–64 3 5 3 11
65+ 0 2 3 5
NS-SECa
1 4 6 5 15
2 3 2 2 7
3 2 1 0 3
4 0 1 2 3
5 2 2 1 5
Political support
Conservative 4 3 3 10
Green 2 3 2 7
Labour 3 4 2 9
Liberal Democrat 2 2 3 7
Role for
governmentb
More in favour 9 7 6 22
More opposed 2 5 4 11
Participant total 11 12 10 33
aUK National Statistics Socio-Economic Classiﬁcation where occupation and employment status
information is used to code ﬁve socio-economic class positions in society
bRole for government measured the extent to which participants favoured government
regulation over individual behaviours. This scale used the short form individualism-
communitarianism items by Kahan et al.31 and showed a very reliable internal consistency
(Cronbach’s α = 0.88)
Table 2 Protocol summary
Time Activities
09:30–10:00 Participant arrival, registration and completion of consent forms
10:00–10:30 Plenary introduction, presentations on climate change and BECCS and questions invited
10:30–10:45 Allocation to groups and quantitative survey of initial perceptions of BECCS and climate change
10:45–12:00 Facilitated qualitative group deliberation on perceptions of BECCS and climate change
12:00–12:30 Lunch break
12:30–14:30 Facilitated qualitative group deliberation on policy scenarios for BECCS incentivisation
14:30–14:45 Second quantitative survey of perceptions of BECCS and climate change
14:45–15:00 Break
15:00–15:30 Plenary summary of group deliberations and wider participant discussion
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around the strengths and weaknesses of each scenario; the implications of a
scenario for citizens; how a scenario might affect energy prices; at what level taxes
might be set; when mandates might come into effect; at what level ﬁnes may be set;
how much governments might pay in ﬁxed amounts; what prices energy sold from
BECCS might be set at; whether lobbying would change the behaviour of fossil fuel
companies; whether there should be additional prerequisites for earning
certiﬁcation; and what the implications of a particular scenario might be for
tackling climate change more broadly.
Policy scenarios. As outlined in the introduction, three policy scenarios were
generated using a modiﬁed version of Bemelmans-Videc et al.’s17 tripartite
typology of economic, regulatory and informational policy instruments17. The
resulting coercive, supportive and persuasive scenarios were each represented by
two concrete policy instruments: taxes and standards in the coercive scenario; ﬁxed
payments and price guarantees in the supportive scenario; and lobbying and cer-
tiﬁcation in the persuasion-based scenario. While not exhaustive, the scenarios
provide a useful heuristic with which to delimit three distinctive and contrasting
approaches to the incentivisation of technological transitions. The scenarios were
presented as approaches that are currently being considered by governments
around the world (see Table 4).
The ﬁrst group was confronted with a “mandating BECCS” scenario in which
coercive instruments would be used to promote BECCS RDD&D. Based on an
analysis of existing policy proposals, this scenario was exempliﬁed with two
instruments: taxes (governments would place a carbon tax on new and existing
fossil fuel power plants to encourage a shift towards BECCS) and standards
(governments would place a direct obligation on new and existing fossil fuel power
plants to be converted to biomass energy and equipped with a carbon capture and
storage system from a speciﬁed date). Failure to comply would result in a ﬁne.
The second group considered a “funding BECCS” policy scenario made up of
two supportive instruments: ﬁxed payments (whereby governments would pay a
ﬁxed amount to operators of BECCS based on how much carbon dioxide they
remove from the atmosphere) and price guarantees (governments would guarantee
a higher price for producers selling energy derived from BECCS facilities).
Finally, the third group was invited to discuss a “persuasion for BECCS”
scenario organised around two instruments: lobbying (governments would seek to
persuade leaders of the energy sector of the beneﬁts of BECCS as a form of energy
generation) and certiﬁcation (governments would introduce an accreditation
scheme that would allow companies that produce or distribute BECCS-derived
energy to advertise that fact with a special logo).
Data analysis. The experiment yielded a wealth of quantitative and qualitative
data for analysis. Quantitative data were transferred to SPSS statistical analysis
software and analysed for descriptive statistics and with non-parametric statistical
tests (see Results for more details). Qualitative data were fully transcribed by a
professional transcription company and subject to thematic analysis using estab-
lished procedures for inductive, semantic and constructionist analysis whereby the
authors became familiar with the data, generated initial codes, searched for themes,
reviewed themes, deﬁned and named themes, and reported them30.
Table 3 Additional technical information on bioenergy with carbon capture and storagea
Technical aspect Information provided
Carbon removal potential A median deployment could remove 3.3 Gt C/year (9.5 Gt C were released in 2011, 555 Gt C have been
released cumulatively since 1750).
Cost estimate Medium cost of €100–400/tCO2 compared to other NETs.
Amount of CO2 removed would be different in different places.
Vulnerability of stored carbon Stored carbon would be vulnerable in the long term to climate change, ﬁres, pests, diseases, forestry policy
changes.
Capacity to reverse climate change Could reverse climate change.
Impacts on ecosystems and
biodiversity
Large impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity are likely.
Uncertainties Considerable uncertainties remain over different types of land and biomass, land-use conﬂicts, impacts on
ecosystems, carbon footprint across the supply chain, the readiness of carbon capture and storage, and
availability of storage sites.
aFrom European Academies Science Advisory Council report on Negative emission technologies: What role in meeting Paris Agreement targets?
Table 4 Policy scenarios for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
Policy scenario Description
Mandating BECCS (group one, coercive
scenario)
Mandating BECCS RDD&D would involve governments taking away resources from fossil fuel energy
companies or inﬂuencing them through rules and directives which mandate them to act in accordance
with what is ordered. This would be done through imposing taxes and standards:
Taxes: Governments would place a carbon tax on new and existing fossil fuel power plants to encourage
a shift towards alternative fuels, such as biomass, and the capture of carbon dioxide.
Standards: Governments would place a direct obligation on new and existing fossil fuel power plants to
be converted to biomass energy and equipped with a carbon capture and storage system from a speciﬁed
date. Failure to comply would result in a ﬁne.
Funding BECCS (group two, supportive
scenario)
Funding BECCS RDD&D would involve governments handing out resources to fossil fuel energy
companies as well as scientists and entrepreneurs developing BECCS technology. This would be done
through providing ﬁxed payments and a price guarantee:
Fixed payments: Governments would pay a ﬁxed amount to operators of BECCS based on how much
carbon dioxide they remove from the atmosphere.
Price guarantee: Governments would guarantee a higher price for producers selling energy derived from
BECCS facilities, as opposed to other kinds of power station.
Persuasion of BECCS (group three,
persuasive scenario)
Persuading fossil fuel energy companies to research, develop, demonstrate and deploy BECCS would
involve governments transferring knowledge and communicating through reasoned argument. This would
be done through lobbying and certiﬁcation:
Lobbying: Governments would seek to persuade leaders of the energy sector of the beneﬁts of BECCS as
a form of energy generation, and would convene multi-stakeholder fora and industry roundtables to make
the case for a transition to BECCS.
Certiﬁcation: Governments would introduce an accreditation scheme that would allow companies that
produce or distribute BECCS-derived energy to advertise that fact with a special logo.
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Ethical review statement. The experiment was conducted with ethical approval
from the University of Oxford Research Ethics Committee. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants prior to their participation.
Data availability
The survey data, audio ﬁles and transcripts generated during the current study are not
publicly available due to the need to respect participant conﬁdentiality. We will consider
requests to make available anonymised survey data and transcripts for research purposes
after an embargo period of 3 years, while our research continues.
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